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Foreign Policy Think Tanks 
in Times of Crisis 
How Do They See Themselves and Their Relevance? 
Contributions to the Debate since 2017 
Nicolas Lux 
The cracks in the international order that politics and scientific policy advice have 
been confronted with for several years have widened further as a result of the corona 
pandemic and its consequences. The outcome of the 2016 Brexit referendum and US 
President Donald Trump’s erratic administration between 2017 and 2021 have already 
called into question long-held foreign policy assumptions concerning ever-advancing 
globalisation and rule-based multilateralism. Unsettled by these developments, which 
go hand in hand with growing populism and the spread of “fake truths”, foreign policy 
think tanks have begun to discuss what effects these will have on scientific policy 
advice. Relevant contributions to the debate in recent years are presented below, re-
volving around key questions such as these: Given the increasingly polarised political 
environment, what are the challenges scientific policy advice is now facing and how 
should think tanks position themselves vis-à-vis the public and politics? And how can 
they maintain their independence and scientific integrity in these uncertain times? 
 
As early as 2016, British politician Michael 
Gove provocatively proclaimed during the 
Brexit campaign that, “People in this coun-
try have had enough of experts”. A selec-
tion of headlines in the international press 
also illustrates the direction the debate 
about science, expertise and think tanks 
has taken in recent years: “Die irritierten 
Experten” [The irritated experts] (Süd-
deutsche Zeitung, 2017); “Are think tanks 
doomed?” (Politico, 2017); “Can think tanks 
survive a post-fact world?” (The Economist, 
2019) – and referring to the COVID-19 
pandemic, “There’s no such thing as just 
‘following the science’ – coronavirus 
advice is political” (The Guardian, 2020). 
Think tanks, which offer independent 
and scientific expertise in the field of 
foreign policy, advise governments and 
parliaments or political decision-makers 
by means of relevant, multidisciplinary, 
application-oriented and fact-based ana-
lyses, whether in publications, briefings 
or other formats. The work of such think 
tanks should support politicians gain a 
better understanding of international rela-
tions and make informed decisions on for-
eign and security policy issues (for further 
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definitions see Lars Brozus and Hanns Maull 
2017, in recommended reading). On both 
sides of the Atlantic, foreign policy think 
tanks have come to play a greater role in 
public debates for a number of reasons. 
The main drivers of this development are 
growing political polarisation in Western 
democracies, the emergence of conspiracy 
theories and “post-factual” truths in politi-
cal discourse, and growing scepticism among 
some parts of the population about elites, 
in general. As a result, the relationship 
between politicians and political advisors is 
also changing and is increasingly character-
ised by mistrust. Other factors include a 
growing number of non-scientific actors in 
an increasingly competitive “knowledge 
market” and, since 2020, the corona pan-
demic which has been a shock for politics 
and societies worldwide. Established foreign 
policy institutes have also been affected 
by these developments, among them think 
tanks with an Anglo-Saxon background that 
were instrumental in providing scientific 
policy advice on international relations 
after the First World War, such as Chatham 
House in the United Kingdom and the 
Council on Foreign Relations in the United 
States. Within the field of foreign policy 
think tanks, there has been a series of dis-
cussions over the past few years which, 
given the multitude of uncertainties in in-
ternational politics, centred on their own 
relevance and role, and their own future. 
In the following, relevant contributions 
from European and Anglo-Saxon foreign 
policy think tanks are discussed, each of 
which depicts a particular angle on the 
debate. The selection includes speeches at 
conferences (available as audio or text files), 
publications in scientific journals and opin-
ion pieces, e.g. in blog format, beginning 
in 2017, i.e. after the Brexit referendum 
and the inauguration of US President Trump. 
The contributions differ in format and 
length, but overall they reflect the multi-
faceted discussion at and among foreign 
policy think tanks. 
Current Challenges for the Work 
of Think Tanks 
At the beginning of 2021, the Transparency 
Register of the European Parliament and 
the European Commission listed 583 en-
tities that categorised themselves as “Think 
tanks and research institutions” (as of 10 
March 2021). The knowledge market, which 
offers political advice to governments and 
parliaments, is not only shaped by think 
tanks but also by many non-scientific actors, 
such as banks and consultants. 
In 2019, Thomas Gomart noted a funda-
mental change to this “marketplace of 
ideas” in a special publication marking the 
40th anniversary of the French Institute 
of International Relations (Ifri). He sees the 
driving force behind changes in the work of 
think tanks coming less from technological 
innovations, such as big data, and more 
from the relationship between think tanks 
and their main contact groups – politics, 
business, media and academia. According 
to Gomart, citing Daniel Drezner and Tom 
Nichols, two American professors in the 
field of international relations, this can be 
explained by three trends in the Western 
world: the loss of public confidence in 
authorities and expertise, a polarisation of 
the political landscape and the staggering 
rise in economic and social inequalities. 
The result is that think tanks compete with 
other “opinion leaders” in the same market, 
such as political movements, consultants 
and the media. According to Gomart, this 
environment is characterised by a relativ-
ism that only allows the “truth” to be con-
sidered a social construct, which promotes 
the spread of conspiracy theories and the 
manipulation of information (“fake news”). 
The marketplace of ideas is further polar-
ised by economic factors, since financial 
resources are distributed unevenly, which 
tends to favour the more established think 
tanks with greater international impact. 
Another factor contributing to the polari-
sation of this marketplace is the fact that 
authoritarian regimes specifically set up 
and promote their own think tanks, while 
their counterparts in democracies all too 
 SWP Journal Review 1 
 March 2021 
 3 
often receive less financial support from 
“their” governments. In this context, Gomart 
also sees the rise of China as a major chal-
lenge for foreign policy think tanks. Beijing 
has invested enormous sums in creating 
such institutes in recent years and has also 
recruited foreign experts for this purpose. 
The intention is for these institutions to be 
able to compete on the international stage 
and particularly with US think tanks. How-
ever, the demands of internationalisation 
are countered by the growing efforts of the 
Chinese leadership to further strengthen 
its own ideological control in the face of 
“dangerous” Western ideas. 
In an article in International Affairs from 
2018, Robin Niblett, the Director of Chatham 
House, named three key challenges that 
think tanks face today. Firstly, new com-
munications technology has changed the 
way politics is made and legitimised. In 
a world with an abundance of news and 
opinions, analyses from think tanks seem-
ingly receive less attention if they do not 
focus on current developments. The strength 
of a think tank to process larger contexts 
through extensive research is no longer 
sufficiently relevant for their target group. 
Secondly, think tanks face a public environ-
ment that is characterised by growing dis-
trust of a globalisation that the think tanks 
themselves have rarely been critical of in 
recent decades. Niblett sees the Brexit ref-
erendum and Trump’s election victory in 
2016 as symptoms of scepticism about so-
called elites who had been advocates of 
such globalisation. These events occurred 
contrary to established “internationalist” 
expert opinions. In the US and UK, there 
was a surge in political opinion that chal-
lenged the decades-old consensus of the 
basic features of the Western liberal, rule-
based world order – that is, the previous 
working basis of Western foreign policy 
think tanks. According to Niblett, think 
tanks now find themselves much more 
confronted by the social effects of global-
ised politics in their own countries that are 
connected to questions of social participa-
tion, cultural identity and the actual ma-
terial benefits of globalisation. Thirdly, 
Niblett points out the reputational risks to 
think tanks that stem from their particular 
funding models and that they apply to both 
publicly and privately funded institutes. 
Rather, think tanks run the risk of being 
less critical and innovative if their donors 
represent institutions (and thus their values) 
that advocate the status quo of internation-
al relations. In addition, think tanks might 
be perceived as being compromised in the 
light of increasing investments by foreign 
governments, private companies and foun-
dations in foreign policy institutes – espe-
cially those based in Washington, Brussels 
and London – in order to strengthen their 
own “soft power”. 
At a panel discussion in 2019 on the 100th 
anniversary of the Council on Foreign Rela-
tions (CFR), its President Richard N. Haass 
spoke about the challenges facing think 
tanks in the field of international relations, 
given how their roles are now changing. 
It is difficult for think tanks nowadays to 
continue to be heard by the foreign policy 
elite and at the same time to expand their 
public outreach in the context of an observ-
able “popularisation” of debates and foreign 
policymaking. The problem with many 
think tanks is that they limit their own 
research work and the recruitment of new 
staff in view of prevailing basic assump-
tions about the international order. Before 
certain recommendations could be drafted 
and represented externally, think tankers 
would have to question those first-order 
issues in the field of foreign policy – for 
example that NATO or free trade “are all 
good things” – and constantly explain 
them in order to gain greater acceptance 
from their target group. According to Haass, 
researchers at think tanks are all too often 
intellectually committed. They have had 
to tow a certain line in order to be able to 
publish, which has further politicised the 
debate on international relations. This has 
meant that think tanks are less able to hold 
their own in an unregulated competition of 
opinions, as is largely the case on the inter-
net. 
In 2017, Rosa Balfour, a Senior Transatlan-
tic Fellow at the German Marshall Fund of 
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the US, also dealt with the reputational 
risks think tanks are exposed to as a result 
of their funding models. As she explains in 
a Strategic Update for the IDEAS think tank 
of the London School of Economics (LSE), 
the field of foreign policy is no longer the 
“elite’s business” operating independently 
of domestic policy considerations. The 
clearest example can be seen in migration-
related issues. Given the current prevalence 
of fake news and populism, the question 
of where individual think tanks get their 
funding has become more politically 
charged. Funding channels that are per-
ceived to be opaque can quickly cast doubt 
on the integrity of a think tank. Further-
more, Balfour also sees increased competi-
tion in the “market for ideas”, where uni-
versities set up think tank units that are 
increasingly trying to attract the attention 
of political customers. It is, however, their 
non-scientific competitors who are ben-
efitting most from this erosion of the legiti-
macy of the “establishment” in politics and 
science. This creates an environment in 
which arguments are deliberately used that 
do not necessarily have to be based on facts. 
Since, according to Balfour, think tanks do 
not have their own political-societal “con-
stituency” that could provide them with a 
basic legitimacy, they run the risk of being 
defenceless against criticism from the popu-
list side. They present think tanks as closed 
echo chambers that help ensure that poli-
tics remains a purely elite matter. 
Forward Strategies for 
Think Tanks in Times of Crisis 
In the debate about the challenges think 
tanks must now face, it is also important 
to consider the longer-term future of the in-
dustry. Above all, this includes suggestions 
as to how the tense relationship between 
them towards the public and politics can be 
improved, how think tanks should change 
internally and how they can maintain their 
(scientific) independence and integrity. 
In an article for the journal Internatio-
nale Politik from 2017, Sarah Brockmeier 
(from the Berlin-based Global Public Policy 
Institute) and Heiko Nitzschke (in charge 
of research at the Policy Planning Staff of 
the Federal Foreign Office, with his private 
opinion) focus on improved communica-
tion and the external impact of political 
advice as possible solution strategies. Ac-
cordingly, contact with ordinary citizens 
can, in principle, help think tanks achieve 
their goals in a difficult political and social 
environment and experts should move 
away from the “echo chambers” that are 
perceived as closed shops. The paper argues 
that the general public, whose interest in 
foreign policy is increasing according to 
surveys, should be viewed more as a sepa-
rate target group for think tank work. There 
could be added value for scientific policy 
advice if real conflicts of interests in for-
eign policy and normative dissent on inter-
national issues were debated in public dis-
cussions. In the end, the conclusions from 
these exchanges might be different from 
those in established foreign policy circles. 
In addition to using simpler and clearer 
language, the authors also suggest bringing 
foreign policy discussion formats out of the 
capitals and to experiment with new ways 
of disseminating their research products. 
Brockmeier and Nitzschke conclude that if 
the role of think tanks were no longer just 
that of “opinion makers”, but also increas-
ingly that of “facilitators” of necessary 
debates in society, they would have to scru-
tinise their own task profiles more closely 
which could ultimately lead to a higher level 
of acceptance of their work in the society.  
Other contributions focus on the question 
of how think tanks can reposition them-
selves in terms of their staff policy, organi-
sational structures and external communi-
cation. In 2018, at an event organised by 
the Brussels-based think tank Brue-
gel, Shada Islam, then Director for Europe 
and Geopolitics at Friends of Europe in 
Brussels, called for think tanks to convey 
their scientific expertise in a more 
comprehensible and persuasive way, in 
order to make themselves heard above the 
din of their competition. In particular, 
social media should not be left to those 
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who seek to influence the public and 
political sphere with untrue claims and 
illiberal narratives. Think tanks ought to 
seek out and employ more diverse staff in 
order to be more responsive to their 
environment. 
In the LSE article mentioned above, Rosa 
Balfour also calls for more innovation and 
ethnic, gender and social diversity among 
think tankers and for better career oppor-
tunities for younger colleagues. At the same 
time, think tanks should innovate their 
research methodologies to find more col-
laborative and interdisciplinary approaches. 
They should also expand their target groups 
to better grasp socially relevant develop-
ments and include them in their own work. 
Other authors focus their attentions on 
discussions between think tanks and policy-
makers. In an article for the “Policy Per-
spectives” series from April 2020, Oliver 
Thränert, head of the think tank at the 
Center for Security Studies at ETH Zurich, 
writes that the corona crisis has highlighted 
the need for think tankers to improve their 
relationships with politicians. Although 
think tanks themselves are not democrati-
cally legitimised, democratically legitimised 
decision-making processes in politics re-
quire science-based, interdisciplinary advice. 
In order for think tanks to be able to meet 
this responsibility during the pandemic and 
beyond, a greater mix of government and 
think tank personnel is needed, as has tra-
ditionally been the case in the US (“revolv-
ing-door culture”), explains Thränert. Ex-
perts could thus gain more experience on 
both sides, and think tanks could in turn 
pass on their knowledge to the ministries 
in a more targeted manner. Thränert advo-
cates making scientific policy advice more 
relevant in a number of ways: through 
more contact with political processes, more 
practice-oriented training for think tankers, 
policy-oriented advice formats and a streng-
thening of the interdisciplinarity between 
natural, social and political sciences. For 
example, the proportion of natural scien-
tists providing policy advice is still too low. 
He suggests that, especially during the on-
going pandemic, think tanks gave the im-
pression that they were only able to react to 
a limited extent and were therefore only of 
limited help to policy-makers. 
In an opinion piece from September 2020, 
Lars Brozus, Senior Fellow at the German 
Institute for International and Security 
Affairs (SWP) in Berlin, warns of the pos-
sible drawbacks of a solution strategy that 
mainly relies on intensified exchanges 
between think tanks, society and the politi-
cal sector. He believes that proposals such 
as those to strengthen contact with ordinary 
citizens or to establish a European “revolv-
ing-door culture” appear to be out of date, 
given the current polarisation. After all, the 
corona crisis did not increase acceptance of 
scientific policy advice either. Brozus refers 
to the situation in the US, where the inde-
pendence of scientific expertise is called 
into questioned in political arguments and 
that scientific positions are deliberately 
hijacked in order to win the opinion battle 
(“weaponising science”). With this in mind, 
think tanks should make sure that they are 
clear about their own political role. On the 
one hand, they would have to guarantee 
transparency, also in terms of their own 
funding, to adhere to rigid standards of 
quality management and create multi-per-
spectivity in research questions. On the 
other hand, they should also be aware of 
their own shortcomings; these include 
“(apparent) failures” as well as “actual 
errors”, which should be dealt with openly. 
The author concludes that by keeping an 
appropriate distance from politics and 
through self-enlightenment political hijack-
ing could be prevented and their own inde-
pendence, credibility and relevance could 
thus be maintained. 
At the aforementioned CFR panel debate 
in 2019, Richard N. Haass also argued the 
case for think tanks to keep their distance 
from political processes. He said they should 
do more conceptual research and policy 
advice, and not just focus on the “day-to-
day” affairs. According to Haass, govern-
ment business is determined too much by 
current developments for analyses from 
think tanks to be adequately included in 
decision-making processes. Think tanks 
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should think long term in order to reach 
the next generation of political leaders. This 
way, they could have greater influence on 
the future of foreign policy debates. 
In a discussion paper from September 
2020, Fabian Zuleeg, Chief Executive at the 
European Policy Centre (EPC) in Brussels, 
calls for an ethical framework for think 
tanks. If think tanks want to continue to 
directly influence democratically legiti-
mised decision-making processes, they 
would have to develop the claim to follow 
a clearly defined set of ethical principles. 
Zuleeg sees unethical think tanks that use 
their work manipulatively for political pur-
poses as a threat to democratic processes in 
general. Since abusive or unethical behav-
iour by a competitor has so far been diffi-
cult to detect and cannot be punished, an 
ethical framework is needed which pro-
vides think tanks with guidelines they can 
adhere to. In contrast to traditional aca-
demic research, policy advice, through 
think tanks and non-academic research 
institutes, had no uniform definition and 
no standards for ethical rules that have an 
inherent normative force. According to the 
author, think tanks that act ethically must 
meet the principles of independence, of a 
multi-stakeholder approach, of transparency 
and good governance. According to Zuleeg, 
such a framework should be developed 
jointly and from the bottom up; it could be 
supported by financial incentives from a 
possible “European Alliance of Independent 
Think Tanks”. Those guilty of unethical 
behaviour could be excluded from the alli-
ance. The negative financial impact of the 
COVID-19 pandemic on think tanks could 
make such an alliance all the more urgent. 
Outlook 
All the contributions presented and dis-
cussed here – among them short speeches, 
opinions pieces or more comprehensive 
journal articles – address the polarisation 
and politicisation of the scientific-political 
discourse and the distrust that parts of so-
ciety have for elites in science and politics. 
When it comes to the question of what 
think tanks can do to deal with this diffi-
cult overall situation, a number of very 
different approaches become visible. They 
range from recommendations to intensify 
discussions with social and political stake-
holders to appeals for policy advice to 
rather keep its distance. However, what all 
these comments have in common is that 
they strive to find solutions that put the 
credibility and relevance of scientific policy 
advice by think tanks in times of polarisa-
tion on a more solid or broader footing. 
The main focus is on maintaining scientific 
independence and transparency, also with 
regard to their funding, and being open to 
diversity and innovative research. 
However, it is also worth mentioning 
what the articles under discussion fail to 
mention. They all assume that foreign 
policy think tanks are, today, confronted by 
a difficult or deteriorating (foreign) political 
landscape. However, the contributions do 
not elaborate on the standards that can be 
applied to the state of international rela-
tions, how the degree of difficulty of the 
think tank’s work can be determined on 
this basis, and where a more in-depth dis-
cussion of the current challenges could 
begin. One of the reasons for this might be, 
among other things, a feeling of discomfort 
for think tankers at having to disclose their 
own ideological principles and expectations 
(personal or institutional) and having them 
put up for discussion.  
Nevertheless, foreign policy think tanks 
must assume that the framework conditions 
in international relations will continue to 
change. Exercises in “strategic foresight” 
(SWP Comment 51/2020) can help them and 
policy-makers be better prepared for “con-
ceivable surprises”. In principle, think 
tanks in the difficult field of foreign policy 
should not only keep one eye on how they 
should respond to the next crisis, but also 
on what scientific policy advice should and 
can actually achieve during such periods 
and beyond. Should it be aimed primarily 
at political decision-makers only? Should 
foreign policy continue to be an “elite’s 
business”? Or, rather, should think tanks 
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make an effort to “popularise” foreign 
policy debates by expanding their target 
group? Are they still perceived as relevant 
actors in an already overcrowded knowl-
edge market? It is not easy to give uniform 
answers to these questions due to the 
heterogeneity of the landscape of foreign 
policy think tanks and the multitude of 
different organisational and funding 
models. The debates within and between 
policy advising research institutes should, 
however, focus on questions of their own 
legitimacy and scientific integrity. 
In-depth reviews and stocktaking of the 
think tank scene might help answer the 
above questions. This is the direction taken 
in a study by Christoph Bertram, former direc-
tor of SWP, and Christiane Hoffmann from 
the magazine Der Spiegel, published in 
September 2020 on the German think tank 
landscape in foreign and security policy. 
Approaches to improve the work of scien-
tific policy advice, for example with new 
theoretical models (e.g. in Science and Tech-
nology Studies, as Felix Schenuit outlined in 
an SWP working paper from 2017), can also 
usefully complement the debate in foreign 
policy think tanks. 
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